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Equitability in Retroactive Key Conscationversus Proactive Key EscrowYvo G. Desmedt?1;2, Mike Burmester1;2, and J. Seberry31 Department of Computer Science, Florida State University, 206 Love Building,Tallahassee, FL 32306-4530, USA,desmedt@cs.fsu.edu, mikeb@dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk2 Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, EghamSurrey TW20 OEX, UK3 Center for Computer Security Research, University of Wollongong, Australia: jennie@uow.edu.auAbstract. The British Regulations of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act2000 is one of the rst modern bills for mandatory disclosure of pro-tected data in a democratic country. In this paper we compare this billfrom a technical point of view with the US key escrow proposal (EES)and its variants and then, more generally we compare the merits of keyconscation vs key escrow.A major problem with key escrow is that once a private key is recoveredit can be used to decipher ciphertexts which were sent well before a war-rant was issued (or after its expiration). Several alternative key escrowsystems have been proposed in the literature to address this issue. Theseare equitable, in the sense that the control of society over the individualand the control of the individual over society are fairly shared. We showthat equitability is much easier to achieve with key conscation thanwith key escrow. Consequently, although the RIP act was heavily criti-cized in the press and on the internet, it inherently maintains a betterlevel of privacy than key escrow.Finally we present some practical deniable decryption variants of popularpublic key systems.Key words: RIP, key escrow, key conscation.1 IntroductionKey escrow was proposed as a mechanism to protect society from criminals whouse encryption to block access to evidence of crime [3,22, 9] (for a taxonomyof key escrow systems see [10]). While the US key escrow proposal (EES) [9]was never approved, the British Regulations of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act2000 [25] has been enacted and is now law. The RIP act has been heavily crit-icized in the press and over the internet (see e.g. [27]). Indeed some internetsocieties have considered boycotting Britain [21]. Moreover, the RIP act is be-ing used as a test case by several other countries who are considering similar? Research undertaken while visiting the University of Wollongong.
2acts [23], so it could be used as an excuse by less democratic countries to weakenthe privacy that encryption provides. A critical analysis is therefore crucial.The RIP act diers in several respects from the EES. With RIP, it is the per-son to whom protected (encrypted) material is addressed who should disclosethe material, if a warrant for this purpose has been issued by the Secretary ofState [25]. Compliance may be achieved by \simply making a disclosure of therelevant information in an intelligent form" [25, section 50(1,a)], but \shall re-quire the disclosure of the (decryption) key, if the disclosure can only be compliedwith the disclosure of the key itself" [25, section 51(1)].Most of the ecient encryption schemes which are currently used (e.g. theSSL [29]) are based on symmetric encryption. For these it would not be possibleto comply with the disclosure requirement unless the (symmetric) session keysare revealed. Therefore it is most likely that with such schemes, key disclosurewill be required. However this is not the case with public key encryption schemes.For example, with the RSA encryption scheme [26] compliance can be achievedby simply disclosing the message(s) (the ciphertext must be the encryption ofthe message). For the ElGamal encryption scheme [14] and DSS [13] disclosingthe message is not sucient: in this case the receiver must also, either revealthe key or prove that the ciphertext is the encryption of the message with thepublic key of the receiver (see Section 3.1).It is important to note that with the RIP act, disclosure of the decryptionkey(s) (or the decrypted ciphertext(s)) may only be required after an investi-gation has started. This is in contrast to key escrow, for which shares of thedecryption keys must be given to the escrow agencies before any investigation.The RIP act clearly has some controversial aspects. For example, the penaltyfor knowingly failing to comply1 with a disclosure warrant is \imprisonment fora term not exceeding two years . . . " [25, section 53(5,a)], whereas tipping o(e.g. an employee who tips o his security manager) can lead \to imprisonmentfor a term not exceeding ve years . . . " [25, section 54(4,a)].Although the RIP act may be somewhat controversial, the idea of conscatinga key is worth comparing with the concept of key escrow. There are several goodreasons for this. The most important one being that numerous papers havealready been published on key escrow (see e.g. [18, 20, 2, 17, 5, 1]), and most ofits problems have been addressed. Furthermore, \key recovery" has often beenused as a synonym for key escrow and there are also several papers published onthis topic (e.g. in [7]). As far as we know there are no scientic papers on keyconscation.We do not claim that our study of key conscation covers all aspects. Indeed,the idea of key escrow is by now (at least) 10 years old [3] and it has taken manyyears to reach the present state of knowledge. Obviously current research on keyescrow will facilitate research on key conscation, but the fact that these notionsare quite dierent may imply new problems, still to be discovered.We focus on a particular problem of key escrow that has received some atten-tion. This problem has to do with the fact that, once the key has been recovered,1 Losing or \forgetting" keys is not an oense(!).
3it can be used to decipher ciphertexts sent well before the warrant was issuedand/or well after the warrant has expired. Several researchers have pointed outthis problem. Lenstra-Winkler-Yacobi [20] state that:the key is supposed to be \returned" (!) at the expiration of the warrant,but non-compliance with this or other Dept. of Justice procedures ex-plicitly \shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or otherobjection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence lawfullyacquired" [11].It is no surprise therefore that alternative key escrow systems have been proposedto address, to a certain extent, this issue (see e.g. [22, 20, 17,5, 1]).The strongest model proposed so far guarantees time-limited decryption evenwhen the escrow agencies are taken over unlawfully. For example, encrypted data(ciphertexts) of law abiding citizens in a democratic society is protected even ifat a later date a dictatorship takes full control of the escrow agencies. Burmester-Desmedt-Seberry have proposed a scheme with this property [5] and give creditto Gus Simmons [28] for having rst observed it. The scheme in [5] howeverneeds some interaction: with each public key updating, the receiver must sendthis key to the sender (the escrow agencies do not need to do this).In this paper we examine how to achieve such a time limitation when work-ing with key conscation. We focus on proven security. This implies that thefollowing trivial key transport mechanism is excluded. The sender uses the pub-lic encryption key of the receiver to send the receiver a new signed session key.Later, if the sender/receiver are forced to open a ciphertext, they just disclosethe session key, without revealing anything else. The problem with this approachis that this is not proven secure. Indeed, given a ciphertext, it may be possiblefor the parties involved to disclose a spurious key and a spurious message whichproduce the same ciphertext. The one-time pad allows such deniable encryp-tion [6]. Other deniable cryptosystems have been studied in [6]. The questionwhether this is possible for DES is not known.Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss attacks by dierentparties in the context of key conscation. Since deniable encryption undermineskey conscation, we analyze it in Section 2.1. In Section 3 we discuss the issuesto guarantee equitable key conscation. Solutions are discussed in Section 4.Before we end, in Section 5 we describe new methods to obtain practical deniableencryption.2 Attacks on key conscationIn this section we discuss some possible types of attack by dierent parties,and in particular those attacks which to a large extent aect the privacy of thecitizens.
42.1 Attacks by citizensThere are several ways to bypass key conscation. As in the case of key escrow,key conscation can be bypassed by using, for example, information hiding tech-niques (see e.g., [24]). However this approach does not not scale well and indeedmost private information is sent by parties who may not (or cannot) use infor-mation hiding technologies. It is therefore important to analyze key conscationfor the case when such technologies are not used.Deniable encryption was proposed by Canetti-Dwork-Naor-Ostrovsky [6],and makes it possible to open a ciphertext in dierent ways. This kind of encryp-tion can therefore be used to undermine key conscation. The simplest exampleof a deniable encryption scheme is the one-time pad. For this scheme, interceptedencrypted data can be opened to produce any cleartext (for an appropriate key).It is clear that key conscation is only eective when the encryption is notdeniable, in other words when the encryption scheme corresponds to a commit-ment scheme.2.2 Active attacks by law enforcement agenciesActive attacks by law enforcement agencies may seem unrealistic. However, theRIP act clearly stipulates the involvement of the Secret Intelligence Service, theGCHQ, and the Defence Intelligence (see e.g. [25, section 6]). Their mission maynot force them to limit themselves to passive attacks. Protection against activeattacks is therefore important.To attack time-limited key conscation, law enforcement agencies can usemalleable attacks [12]. Let us consider such a type of attack in more detail.Suppose that an agency wants to get hold of the plaintext M1 of a ciphertextC1, sent before the time-limited warrant was granted, and suppose that a party(e.g. an insider) is willing to help the law enforcement agency. For this purposethe party can send a ciphertext C2 whose plaintextM2 will leak some informationaboutM1. A particular case of this attack is a replay attack, for which C2 = C1.3 RequirementsAlthough it is often common in modern cryptography to give formal models, wewill see that many of the models we need already exists. We therefore discussthe requirements in a more informal way.3.1 An introductionIt is obvious that for a public key encryption scheme which is also a commitmentscheme, the sender can comply with disclosure by simply revealing the messageand the randomness used.If no randomness is used, as for example with RSA, then disclosure of themessage it is sucient. If randomness is used, as for example with ElGamal or
5DSS, then the receiver does not know the randomness (if the discrete logarithmis hard). However in this case it is still possible for the receiver to comply withthe disclosure notice without revealing any private keys. For this purpose thereceiver must use an interactive zero-knowledge proof [16] to prove that theciphertext is the encryption of the plaintext with the public key of the receiver(a proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm [8] can be used for ElGamal orDSS).Note that the RIP act states that [25, Section 50(5)]:It shall not be necessary, for the purpose of complying with the require-ment, for the person given notice to make a disclosure of any keys inaddition to those the disclosure of which is, alone, sucient to enablethe person to whom they are disclosed to obtain access to the informationand to put it into an intelligible form.So with public key encryption schemes the receiver can comply with the RIP actwithout having revealing the encryption keys.If public keys are used to distribute the session keys of a symmetric encryptionscheme (as in SSL), then disclosure is complied by simply revealing the sessionkeys.3.2 Undeniable key conscationRevealing the randomness used, or proving that the message and ciphertext areproperly linked with the public key of the receiver, is only an eective meansof disclosure from the point of view of enforcement agency if the encryptionscheme is not deniable. We call such schemes, undeniable. As mentioned earlier,undeniable encryption schemes are also commitment schemes. For the sake ofcompleteness and to avoid any ambiguity (due to the denition of blobs in [4])we give the denition below.Denition 1. Let C be the ciphertext and E be the encryption function withk the receiver's public key. The encryption system E is undeniable if, for allciphertexts C, for all plaintexts m;m0, and for all random choices r; r0,C = Ek(m; r) = Ek(m0; r0) implies m = m0.If no randomness is used, as in the case of RSA, we take the randomness to bethe empty string. So the denition is suciently general. As we know RSA doesnot oer the security of schemes that use randomness [15].3.3 Sender and receiver coercibilityCanetti-Dwork-Naor-Ostrovsky[6] observed that both the sender and the re-ceiver can be coerced into revealing the message. Since this is the goal of keyconscation, we dene the following.
6Denition 2. An undeniable encryption scheme is receiver coercible if, givena ciphertext C = Ek(m; r), with k the public key of the receiver, the receivercan produce the randomness r and the plaintext m. An undeniable encryptionscheme which does not have this property is only sender coercible.Although receiver coercibility is an important property for fair key consca-tion, a weaker form allows the receiver to prove that the revealed message is thecorrect one.Denition 3. An undeniable encryption scheme is receiver coercible with proofif, given C = Ek(m; r) the receiver can prove in zero-knowledge that the revealedplaintext m is correct.Note that the ElGamal scheme is an example of an undeniable encryptionscheme which is receiver coercible with proof, but it is not receiver coercible (ifthe discrete logarithm is hard).We are now in a position to discuss equitable key conscation.3.4 Equitable key conscationSince we do not have escrow agencies with key conscation, it may seem thatone should not be concerned with the possibility of unlawful government action.This would make our analysis much simpler.However, this impression is wrong. After a coup all senders of messages maybe forced to reveal the plaintext-randomness pairs (m; r) of ciphertexts C =Ek(m; r) sent long before the coup. A scheme that protects against such anattack is called equitable.A weaker form of equitability requires that the tevealing of randomness doesnot leak anything additional about an unrevealed plaintext m of a ciphertextC = Ek(m; r). We call this weak equitability .4 SolutionsWe now consider two solutions.Solution 1. A probabilistic public key encryption scheme which is secure againstknown-plaintext attacks and is also a commitment scheme, is an undeniable keyconscation scheme which is equitable against passive attacks by the law enforce-ment agency who coerces the sender.This follows immediately from the denitions, e.g. of known-plaintext attack. Forequitability, we assume that it is legal for all senders to erase the randomnessused after a certain time limit.Solution 2. The Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme [15] is an undeniablekey conscation scheme which is sender/receiver coercible.Indeed, the trapdoor (the factorization of n) can be used to nd the randomness
7of the sender. However, equitability is limited to the passive case, when the lawenforcement agency does not coerce the receiver. Indeed, since the sender knowsthe trapdoor that is needed to compute the randomness, only weak equitabilitycan be obtained relative to the sender.A public key scheme which is secure against chosen-text attacks and whichis also a commitment scheme, is an undeniable key conscation scheme whichis sender equitable against active attacks by the law enforcement agency. Suchpractical schemes have been considered in the literature , e.g., in [30].5 New deniable encryption schemesBefore we conclude we discuss some new ways to achieve deniable encryption.A deniable encryption scheme [6] allows the sender to open the ciphertext asany message. Canetti-Dwork-Naor-Ostrovsky's work focused on the case whenthe message space is f0; 1g. A weaker denition of deniability would allow thesender to be able to deny having sent a specic message by opening a dierentmessage, not just any message. If the message space is f0; 1g, then of course thetwo denitions are identical. In many practical encryption schemes the cardinal-ity of the message space is larger than two.5.1 A heuristic schemeOur scheme is a variant of the RSA encryption scheme.Set-up: Alice chooses 4 dierent large primes p1, p2, p3 and p4. She then com-putes n1 = p1  p2, n2 = p3  p4, n = p1  p2  p3  p4, (n1) (the Carmichaelfunction2 of n [19]), (n2). Alice then chooses e1 2R Z(n1) and e2 2R Z(n2).Since (n) = lcm((n1); (n2)) she can compute the unique e modulo (n) suchthat: e = e1 mod (n1)e = e2 mod (n2)Alice publishes (e; n) as her public key and gives (e1; n1) and (e2; n2) to herfriends.Encryption:For Bob who is not a friend of Alice: Bob uses the normal RSA encryption.The scheme is undeniable for Bob.For Carol who is a friend of Alice: Carol uses the key (e1; n1) instead of (e; n).Let M1 be the message that Carol wants to encrypt. Carol rst computes C1 =M e11 mod n1. Then she chooses a C2 at random from Zn2 and uses the ChineseRemainder Theorem to combine C1 and C2 uniquely into a C mod n. This is2 (n) is the least positive integer for which we have b(n) = 1 mod n for all b 2 Zn.If n = pq, the product of two dierent odd primes, then (n) = lcm(p  1; q   1).
8the ciphertext she sends to Alice. If Alice is coerced, she produces the uniquemessage M which is such that C =M e mod n, which looks likely as random.Observe that the eective bandwidth for Carol is reduced. Can our techniquesbe used to make high-bandwidth proven secure deniable encryption? Also, theRSA is not a proven secure cryptosystem.6 ConclusionAlthough key conscation may not be constitutional in countries that protectcitizens against self incrimination,we have shown that it clearly has some privacyadvantages over key escrow.In this paper we focused on the time-limited properties of key conscationand observed that deniable encryption prevents undeniable key conscation. Thispaper also opens several new research problems, in particular:1. Since the US key escrow proposal is not mandatory while the British RIP actis, it is worth studying the properties of key conscation in greater details. Inparticular what other advantages/disadvantages does key conscation haveover key escrow?2. The question on how to obtain equitability relative to the receiver for ascheme which is also receiver coercible seems hard to address. A trivial, butunacceptable solution would be for the sender to destroy his/her secret key.Another trivial solution would be to update the public key on a regular basis,but such a solution is too impractical.DisclaimerThe authors have focused on technical aspects of privacy. It is not the goal of thispaper to endorse the British Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.References1. M. Abe. A key escrow scheme with time-limited monitoring for one-way commu-nication. In E. Dawson, A. Clark, and C. Boyd, editors, Information Security andPrivacy, 5th Australian Conference, ACISP 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-ence 1841, Springer 2000, 163{177.2. M. Bellare and S. Goldwasser. Veriable partial key escrow. In Proceedings of the4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, April 1997.3. T. Beth. Zur Sicherheit der Informationstechnik. Informatik-Spektrum, 13, 1990,204{215. (In German)4. G. Brassard, D. Chaum, and C. Crepeau. Minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge.Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 37(2), 1998, 156{1895. M. Burmester, Y. Desmedt, and J. Seberry. Equitable key escrow with limited timespan. In K. Ohta and D. Pei, editors, Advances in Cryptology | Asiacrypt '98,Proceedings Lecture Notes in Computer Science #1514, Springer 1998, 380{391
96. R. Canetti, C. Dwork, M. Naor, and R. Ostrovsky. Deniable encryption. In B. S.Kaliski, editor, Advances in Cryptology | Crypto '97, Proceedings, Lecture Notesin Computer Science #1294, Springer 1997, 90{1047. Key recovery alliance (KRA) technology papers. Special Issue of Computer & Se-curity, 2000, 19(1).8. D. Chaum and J.-H. Evertse and J. van de Graaf and R. Peralta. In A. Odlyzko,editor, Advances in Cryptology, Proc. of Crypto '86, Lecture Notes in ComputerScience #263, Springer-Verlag 1987, 200{2129. A proposed federal information processing standard for an escrowed encryptionstandard (EES). Federal Register, July 30, 1993.10. D. E. Denning and D. K. Branstad. A taxonomy of key escrow encryption systems.Commun. ACM, 39(3), 1996, 34{4011. Department of Justice Brieng Re Escrowed Encryption Standard, Department ofCommerce, Washington D.C., February 4, 1994.12. D. Dolev, C. Dwork, and M. Naor. Non-malleable cryptography. In Proceedings ofthe Twenty third annual ACM Symp. Theory of Computing, STOC, 1991, 542{55213. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186,http://www.itl.nist.gov/pspubs/p186.htm14. T. ElGamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discretelogarithms. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 1985, 31, 469{47215. S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. Probabilistic encryption. Journal of Computer andSystem Sciences, 28(2), 1984, 270{29916. S. Goldwasser and S. Micali and C. Racko. The Knowledge Complexity of Inter-active Proof Systems. Siam J. Comput., 18(1), 1989, 186{20817. J. He and E. Dawson. A new key escrow cryptosystem. In E. Dawson and. J. Golic,editor, Cryptography Policy and Algorithms, Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Com-puter Science #1029, Springer 1996, 105{11418. J. Kilian and T. Leighton. Failsafe key escrow, revisited. In D. Coppersmith, editor,Advances in Cryptology | Crypto '95, Proceedings, Lecture Notes in ComputerScience# 963, Springer 1995, 208{22119. D. E. Knuth. The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 2, Seminumerical Algo-rithms. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1981.20. A. K. Lenstra, P. Winkler, and Y. Yacobi. A key escrow system with warrantbounds. In D. Coppersmith, editor, Advances in Cryptology | Crypto '95, Proceed-ings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science #963, Springer 1995, 197{20721. C. D. Marsan. Internet organization opposes new u.k. wiretapping law.http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/08/04/wiretap.ap.idg/index.html22. S. Micali. Fair public-key cryptosystems. In E. F. Brickell, editor, Advances inCryptology | Crypto '92, Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 740,Springer 1993, 113{13823. R. Perera. Dutch secret service accused of e-mail snooping.http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/08/02/netherlands.email.idg/index.htm24. A. Ptzmann, editor. Information Hiding, Third International Workshop, Proceed-ings Lecture Notes in Computer Science #1768, Springer 1999.25. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.http://www.homeoce.gov.uk/ripa/ripact.htm.26. R. L. Rivest and A. Shamir and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digitalsignatures and public key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM, 1978 21, 294{29927. L. Rohde. U.K. E-mail Snooping Bill passed.http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/07/28/uk.surveillance.idg/index.html
1028. G. J. Simmons, observation made at the Workshop on Key Escrow, June 22{24,1994.29. SSL vs 3.0, http://home.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/30. Y. Tsiounis and M. Yung. The security of ElGamal based encryption. In H. Imaiand Y. Zheng, editors, Public Key Cryptography, First International Workshop onPractice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography, PKC'98, Springer 1998, 117{134
